Tuesday, 9 April 2013

Cancellation of Bail in Delhi High Court,


Cancellation of Bail in High Court.

" In considering whether to cancel
the bail the Court has also to consider the gravity and
nature of the offence, prima facie case against the accused,
the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are
very serious allegations against the accused his bail may be
cancelled even if he has not misused the bail granted to him.
Moreover, the above principle applies when the same Court
which granted bail is approached for canceling the bail. It
will not apply when the order granting bail is appealed
against before an appellate/revisional Court.”







IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
SUBJECT : INDIAN PENAL CODE
CRL.M.C. 738/2010
Reserved on: 16th March, 2012
Decided on: 13th April, 2012
SANJEEV GUPTA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anil Soni, Advocate.
 versus
STATE & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Mukesh Gupta, APP for the State with SI Ranjeet Singh,
PS Roop Nagar.
 Mr. Bharat Dubey, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
Coram:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
1. By the present petition the Petitioner seeks cancellation of bail of
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in case FIR No. 1 of 2009 under Sections
325/308/34 IPC registered at PS Roop Nagar, Delhi.
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that on 15th December,
2008 the Petitioner was assaulted by the accused person wherein he received
grievous injuries as is evident from the discharge summary of Sant
Parmanand Hospital. However, the police did not register the FIR
immediately and only on 1st January, 2009, the abovementioned FIR was
registered under Section 325/34 IPC, which is a bailable offence. Section
308 IPC though attracted was added later on and the learned Trial Court has
also framed charge against Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 for offence under Section
308 IPC. On 2nd April, 2009, Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were granted
anticipatory bail because the Investigating Officer concealed material facts
before the learned Trial Court. Immediately on grant of anticipatory bail,
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 again assaulted the Petitioner on 24th May, 2009 and
with a great difficulty another FIR No. 118/2009 was lodged under Sections
325/34 IPC at PS Roop Nagar. Thereafter again on 3rd August, 2009, Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 attacked on the Petitioner however, no FIR has been
registered by the police despite statement of the Petitioner having been
recorded. According to the learned counsel, Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 are
constantly threatening the Petitioner and his family members. Thus, on 17th
September, 2009 the Petitioner filed an application for cancellation of the
bail of Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 before the learned Trial Court. However, by
the order dated 1st December, 2010 the said application was dismissed and
thus the Petitioner has filed the present petition. It is further submitted that
in FIR 118/2009 the police deliberately filed a cancellation report on 8th
August, 2009 though the statement of the wife of the Petitioner was recorded
on 30th November, 2009. The Petitioner received a back dated letter of 24th
May, 2009 on 10th May, 2010 stating that the police has closed the case of
the Petitioner.
3. Learned counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 on the other hand
contends that the Petitioner is a habitual litigant and has already taken
money from Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 for vacating the premises, however, he
is still not satisfied and is filing the present applications for extorting more
money. The Petitioner is living in Sonepat and there is no contact between
the Petitioner and Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Not only the behaviour of the
Petitioner with Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 is abusive and quarrelsome but also
the Petitioner is in a habit of quarrelling with everybody. When the PCR
took him to the Hindu Rao Hospital for the incident dated 15th December,
2008 he even quarreled with the doctor and wanted the doctor to opine the
injury to be dangerous in nature. When the doctor did not accede to the
request of the Petitioner, he left the hospital without medical advice.
Thereafter he went to Sant Parmanand Hospital and the same being a private
hospital, the Petitioner got manipulated the documents. A perusal of the
MLC of the Hindu Rao Hospital and Sant Parmanand Hospital would show
a striking difference in nature of injuries opined. According to the Sant
Parmanand Hospital the Petitioner suffered a fracture and in such a situation,
no person can move. After the alleged incident, three years have lapsed and
there is no incident of violence committed by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4. Thus
the liberty of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 be not curtained on the
uncorroborated and unverified allegations of the Petitioner. The Petitioner is
a habitual litigant and keeps on fighting with the people and thus ten other
people have also filed complaints against the petitioner.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. Briefly the case of the prosecution is that on 15th December, 2008 an
information was received at PS Roop Nagar vide DD No. 22A from PCR
regarding a quarrel on second floor of House No.A-28, Kamla Nagar. The
Petitioner sustained injuries and was taken to Hindu Rao Hospital for
treatment in PCR van. His MLC was prepared which stated that smell of
alcohol was present. Later on, the Petitioner left the hospital without
medical advice on 16th December, 2008 and got himself admitted at Sant
Parmanand Hospital. After getting opinion on the MLC, the
abovementioned FIR was registered. On 9th January, 2009 the investigation
of the case was transferred to the District Investigation Unit, North East
District. On 2nd April, 2009 Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were granted
anticipatory bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and on 11th
August, 2009 a regular bail by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The
charge sheet was filed for offence under Sections 308/325/34 IPC on 8th
July, 2009 and charge was framed against Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
6. The main contention of the Petitioner for cancellation of bail is that
after the anticipatory bail the Petitioner has been again assaulted by
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 on 24th May, 2009 for which FIR No. 118/2009
under Sections 325/24 IPC has been registered. It may be noted that in the
said FIR, since no evidence came on record in support of the version of the
Petitioner, a cancellation report has already been filed. The Complainant and
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 are cousin brothers living in the same building
however, having estranged relations. Since the allegations of again
assaulting the Petitioner by the Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 after having been
granted anticipatory bail have not been substantiated, prima facie there is no
case for cancellation of bail. Further the cancellation of bail is a serious
matter and has to be sparingly resorted as held by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Dolat Ram and others vs. State of Haryana, 1995 (1) SCC 349. The
relevant para of the report reads as under:
“Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the
cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on
different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary
for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally
speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not
exhaustive) are: interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of
administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of
justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The
satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the
possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a
mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow
the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during
the trial.”
7. Hence, I find no merit in the present petition. Petition is dismissed.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
 JUDGE
APRIL 13, 2012




IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
SUBJECT : INDIAN PENAL CODE
CRL.M.C. No.2812/2011
Judgment delivered on: 02nd March, 2012
SUNNY JAGLAN Petitioner
Through : Mr.Dharam Raj Ohlan, Adv
versus
STATE & ORS Respondents
Through : Ms.Rajdipa Behura, APP for State Mr.Ritesh Bahri,
Mr.Randeep Kumar and Mr.Rahul Bhagat, Advs for
R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
SURESH KAIT, J. (Oral)
1. Vide instant the petition, the petitioner has sought to
set aside the order dated 12.08.2011 whereby learned
Additional Sessions Judge – IV, SE, Saket Courts, New Delhi
admitting the respondent No.2 on regular bail in case FIR
No.346/2010 under Section 307/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860
registered at police station Hauz Khas, New Delhi on the
complaint of petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that initially
respondent No.2 moved an anticipatory bail application
which was rejected even upto the Apex Court. Thereafter, on
09.08.2011, respondent No.2 surrendered before the Court
and sent to judicial custody. Thereafter, respondent No.2
moved an application for bail which was allowed by learned Additional Sessions Judge by impugned order just after four
days of his judicial custody.
3. Facts in brief of the case are that when the petitioner
reached Pancsheel, Chirag Delhi Flyover, then one red colour
Maruti Swift car driven by respondent No.2 got his car
turned on his right hand side without giving any signal. The
car of the respondent No.2 hit with car of the petitioner /
complainant. The petitioner parked his car on the side of
the road to check any damage on his car. Meanwhile,
respondent No.2/accused got down from his car and started
abusing the petitioner. The petitioner admitted his mistake
and requested to go away, but he was very angry and was
in a drunken condition. He became too furious and brought
beer bottle from his car which having half full of beer. He
broke the same by hitting it on the car and told that he
would teach a lesson to the petitioner for hitting his car and
attacked on petitioner/complainant with broken sharp edge
broken bottle and gave multiple blows on face, head,
shoulder and neck. Accordingly, the above mentioned FIR
was registered initially under Section 308 Indian Penal Code,
1860 and later on converted into Section 307 Indian Penal
Code, 1860 on being the application moved by petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the
respondent No.2 caused injuries of grievous nature and that
too on the vital body part of the petitioner, therefore, in the
facts and circumstances of the case, learned Additional
Sessions Judge would not have admitted the respondent
no.2 on bail as he remained in custody only for four days.
5. To buttress his contentions, learned counsel for
petitioner has relied upon Prakash Kadam & Ors v.
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr 2011 (5) LRC 54 (SC)
wherein it has been held by the Apex Court as under:-
“16. It was contended by learned counsel for the appellants
before us, and it was also contended before the High Court,
that the considerations for cancellation of bail is different from the consideration of grant of bail vide Bhagirathsinh
s/o Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat(1984) 1 SCC
284, Dolat Ram and others v. State of Haryana (1995) 1
SCC 349 and Ramcharan v. State of M.P. (2004) 13 SCC
617.
17. However, we are of the opinion that that is not an
absolute rule, and it will depend on the facts and
circumstances of the case. In considering whether to cancel
the bail the Court has also to consider the gravity and
nature of the offence, prima facie case against the accused,
the position and standing of the accused, etc. If there are
very serious allegations against the accused his bail may be
cancelled even if he has not misused the bail granted to him.
Moreover, the above principle applies when the same Court
which granted bail is approached for canceling the bail. It
will not apply when the order granting bail is appealed
against before an appellate/revisional Court.”
6. Refuting the contention of learned counsel for
petitioner, on the other hand, learned counsel for
respondent No.2 submitted that respondent No.2
surrendered before the Court on 09.08.2011 in the instant
case and thereafter on being application moved he was
admitted to bail vide order dated 12.08.2011 by learned
Additional Sessions Judge.
7. On completion of investigation, charge-sheet filed and
charges have already been framed on 03.01.2012 against
the respondent No.2. Learned Trial Court has also examined
two witnesses on 01.02.2012. The petitioner / complainant
was summoned by learned Trial Court, however, he did not
appear on date fixed.
8. Learned counsel further submits that though the
incident took place is very unfortunate. The petitioner was
also under the influence of alcohol, as has been recorded in
MLC dated 16.10.2010. The altercation took place on hitting
the car of the respondent, but the petitioner was driving the car after consuming liquor. Therefore, there is no ground to
cancel the bail, when the matter is pending trial.
9. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has relied upon
the decision rendered by this Court in State v. Satya
Parkash 2011 (10) LRC 318 (Delhi) wherein it has been held
as under:-
“62. Additionally, law is settled on bail in Prakash Kadam v.
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta (2011) 6 SCC 189 wherein it
has been observed as under:-
“16. The Sessions Court granted bail to the appellants but
that has been cancelled by the High Court by the impugned
judgment.
17. xxx xxx xxx
18. In considering whether to cancel the bail the court has
also to consider the gravity and nature of the offence, prima
facie case against the accused, the position and standing of
the accused, etc. If there are very serious allegations
against the accused his bail may be cancelled even if he has
not misused the bail granted to him. Morevoer, the above
principle applies when the same court which granted bail is
approached for cancelling the bail. It will not apply when
the order granted bail is appealed against before an
appellant/ Revisional Court.
19. In our opinion, there is no absolute rule that once bail
is granted to the accused then it can only be cancelled if
there is likelihood of misuse of the bail. The factor, though
no doubt important, is not the only factor. There are several
other factors also which may be seen while deciding to
cancel the bail.”
63. In another case of Apex Court, Bhagirathsingh v. State
of Gujarat (1984) 1 SCC 284 wherein it has held as under:-
“In our opinion, the learned Judge appears to have
misdirected himself while examining the question of
directing cancellation of bail by interfering with a
discretionary order made by the learned Sessions Judge. One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge
of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him
that the victim attacked was a social and political worker
and therefore the accused should not be, granted bail but
we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be
considered so overriding as to permit interference with a
discretionary order of the learned Sessions Judge granting
bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it
was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted
but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail.
Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances all necessary
for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend
today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled
by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant
bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is
being imposed. The only material considerations in such a
situation are whether the accused would be readily available
for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion
granted ill his favour by tampering with evidence. The order
made by the High Court is conspicuous by its silence on
these two relevant considerations. It is for these reasons
that we consider in the interest of justice a compelling
necessity to interfere with the order made by the High
Court.”
65. Giving any opinion on the facts of the case at this stage
would prejudice the trial as the matter is still in its infancy.
However, it is well settled that once bail is granted the same
should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner, without
considering whether any supervening circumstances have
rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial, to allow the
accused, to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during trial.
68. For the reasons stated above I am of the considered
view that no ground to interfere with the impugned order
passed by learned Trial Court is made out. The said order is
a well reasoned order and I conquer with the same.”10. Reliance has also been placed on Aslam Bablal Desai v.
State of Maharashtra 1992 Crl. L. J. 3712 wherein the Apex
Court has held as under:-
“11. On a conjoint reading of Sections 57 and 167 of the
Code it is clear that the legislative object was to ensure
speedy investigation after a person has been taken in
custody. It expects that the investigation should be
completed within 24 hours and if this is not possible within
15 days and failing that within the time stipulated in Clause
(a) of the proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code. The law
expects that the investigation must be completed with
despatch and the role of the Magistrate is to over-see the
course of investigation and to prevent abuse of the law by
the investigating agency. As stated earlier, the legislative
history shows that before the introduction of the proviso to
Section 167(2) the maximum time allowed to the
investigating agency was 15 days under Sub-section (2) of
Section 167 failing which the accused could be enlarged on
bail. From experience this was found to be insufficient
particularly in complex cases and hence the proviso was
added to enable the Magistrate to detain the accused in
custody for a period exceeding 15 days but not exceeding
the outer limit fixed under the proviso (a) to that subsection. We may here mention that the period prescribed by
the proviso has been enlarged by State amendments and
wherever there is such enlargement, the proviso will have to
be read accordingly. The purpose and object of providing for
the release of the accused under Sub-section (2) of Section
167 on the failure of the investigating agency completing the
investigation within the extended time allowed by the
proviso was to instill a sense of urgency in the invest ting
agency to complete the investigation promptly and within
the statutory time-frame. The deeming fiction of correlating
the release on bail under Sub-section (2) of Section 167 with
Chapter XXXIII, i.e. Sections 437 and 439 of the Code, was
to treat the order as one passed under the latter provisions.
Once the order of release is by fiction of law an order passed under Sections 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) it follows as a
natural consequence that the said order can be cancelled
under Sub-section (5) of Section 437 or Sub-section (2) of
Section 439 on considerations relevant for cancellation of an
order thereunder. As stated in Raghubir Singh's case the
grounds for cancellation under Sections 437(5) and 439(2)
are identical, namely, bail granted under Sections 437(1) or
(2) or 439(1) can be cancelled where (i) the accused
misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity,
(ii) interferes with the course of invistigation, (iii) attempts
to tamper with evidence or witnesses, (iv) threatens
witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would
hamper smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his
fleeing to another country, (vi) attempts to make himself
scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the
investigating agency, (vii) attempts to place himself beyond
the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative
and not exhaustive. It must also be remembered that
rejection of bail stands on one footing but cancellation of bail
is a harsh order because it interferes with the liberty of the
individual and hence it must not be lightly resorted to.
14. We sum up as under:
The provisions of the Code, in particular Sections 57 and
167, manifest the legislative anxiety that once a persons'
liberty has been interfered with by the police arresting him
without a court's order or a warrant, the investigation must
be carried out with utmost urgency and completed within
the maximum period allowed by the proviso (a) to Section
167(2) of the Code. It must be realised that the said proviso
was introduced in the Code by way of enlargement of time
for which the arrested accused could be kept in custody.
Therefore, the prosecuting agency must realise that if it fails
to show a sense of urgency in the investigation of the case
and omits or defaults to file a charge sheet within the time
prescribed, the accused would be entitled to be released on
bail and the order passed to that effect under Section 167(2)
would be an order under Sections 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) of the Code. Since Section 167 does not empower cancellation
of the bail, the power to cancel the bail can only be traced to
Section 437(5) or 439(2) of the Code. The bail can then be
cancelled on considerations which are valid for cancellation
of bail granted under Section 437(1) or (2) or 439(1) of the
Code. The fact that the bail was earlier rejected or that it
was secured by the thrust of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of
the Code then recedes in the background. Once the accused
has been released on bail his liberty cannot be interfered
with lightly i.e. on the ground that the prosecution has
subsequently submitted a charge-sheet. Such a view would
introduce a sense of complacency in the investigating
agency and would destroy the very purpose of instilling a
sense of urgency expected by Sections 57 and 167(2) of the
Code. We are, therefore, of the view that once an accused is
released on bail under Section 167(2) he cannot be taken
back in custody merely on the filing of a charge-sheet but
there must exists special reasons for so doing besides the
fact that the charge-sheet reveals the commission of a nonbailable crime. The ratio of Rajnikant's case to the extent it
is inconsistent herewith does not, with respect, state the law
correctly.”
11. In the facts and circumstances of the case, considering
the legal proposition in above mentioned decisions of the
Apex Court, I am not inclined to interfere with the order
passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge granting the
bail to respondent No.2.
12. Accordingly, Criminal M.C.No.2812/2011 is dismissed.
13. No order as to costs.
Sd./-
 SURESH KAIT, J
MARCH 02, 2012

Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 1 of 20
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011
% Judgment reserved on :15th September, 2011
Judgment delivered on:22th September, 2011
GAYATRI DEVI ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Mohit Mathur & Mr.Shishir
Mathur, Advs
Versus
STATE & ORS ..... Respondents
Through:Ms.Rajdipa Behura, APP for
State with Inspector Prabhu Dayal,
police station Janakpuri in person.
Mr.Avadh Bihari Kaushik & Mr.Yogesh
Rathee, Advs for respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESH KAIT
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? No.
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes.
SURESH KAIT, J.
1. Vide the present petition, the petitioner has assailed
the order dated 21.04.2011 passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge, whereby the respondent No.2/accused has
been admitted on bail. Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 2 of 20
2. Before adverting to the petition, let briefly recapitulate
the facts.
3. A case under Section 498A/304B Indian Penal Code was
registered against respondent No.2 and his relatives vide FIR
No.324/2009 dated 31.12.2009 at police station Janakpuri,
New Delhi.
4. Initially, respondent No.2 moved an anticipatory bail
application before the Sessions Court which was rejected
vide order dated 20.01.2010.
5. Being aggrieved, he approached this Court and vide
order dated 10.03.2010, the petition of respondent No.2 was
rejected.
6. Thereafter, respondent No.2 moved Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court and vide order dated
05.04.2010, respondent No.2 was granted interim relief.
7. Vide order dated 07.01.2011, during the pendency of
the said SLP of respondent No.2, Hon’ble Supreme Court
wanted to see the FSL report, but the same was not
available on the record. Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 3 of 20
However, during the pendency of the SLP the
investigating agency filed the charge-sheet in the present
case on 13.01.2011. Further, on 28.01.2011, investigating
agency filed the supplementary charge-sheet.
8. After perusing the FSL report; vide order dated
11.02.2011, the Apex Court dismissed the SLP. After which,
respondent No.2 surrendered before the Court and moved a
bail application under Section 439 Code of Criminal
Procedure, same was dismissed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge vide order dated 07.03.2011.
9. After committal of the case, the investigating officer
Inspector Prabhu Dayal, visited the house of the petitioner
and investigated the incident of threat given by Surat Singh
s/o Sugad Ram, brother of the accused/respondent No.2 to
the son of the petitioner against which, the complaint was
lodged on 09.01.2010 by the son of the petitioner.
10. Respondent No.2 moved another bail application before
the learned Trial Court. After hearing both the parties,
learned Additional Sessions Judge had dismissed the same
vide order dated 07.03.2011.Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 4 of 20
11. The main pleas raised by learned counsel for petitioner
is that same learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the
bail application under Section 439 Code of Criminal
Procedure of the respondent No.2 vide its order dated
07.03.2011, whereas, by the impugned order dated
21.04.2011, respondent No.2 was admitted to bail.
12. In the order dated 07.03.2011, learned Additional
Sessions Judge while dismissing the first bail application had
observed as under:-
“Admittedly, deceased Meenu had died
within eight months of her marriage with
the Applicant. As discussed above, there is
sufficient allegation of cruelty and using
abusive language by the Applicant to the
deceased and also physical beatings and
torture by the accused/Applicant to the
deceased as result, she has committed
suicide. There is no doubt that the
allegation against the accused/Applicant
are serious and the gravity of the offence is
not in dispute. The material as discussed
above shows that the accused/Applicant
has allegedly extended threats to the
brother of the deceased after his wife Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 5 of 20
committed suicide and had died in
unnatural circumstances due to the alleged
mental and physical torture committed by
the accused /Applicant. In these facts and
circumstances, I am of the opinion that in
case the accused/Applicant is released on
bail, there is every likelihood that he may
tamper with the prosecution evidence and
may hamper the fair trial in this case.
Therefore, seeing the gravity of the offence
and in totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case, I do not find any
ground for granting bail to the
accused/Applicant. The application is
accordingly, dismissed. Copy of this order
be sent along with the Trial Court record.
Accused/Applicant be produced before
Ld.ACMM (West) on 08.03.2011 at
10.00am. Copy of the order be given dasti.”
13. Thereafter, learned Additional Sessions Judge granted
bail to respondent No.2 after spending 45 days in jail on the
second bail application moved by respondent No.2, has
observed as follows:-
“On 31.03.2011 2nd bail application was
moved by the accused seeking bail on the
ground that there are new ground for Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 6 of 20
consideration by this Court for granting bail
because there is no apprehension of threat
to the witness at all. It is further argued
that deceased committed suicide because
of depression and not because of any
alleged harassment and torture by the
accused persons; the arrest of the accused
was stayed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and
during investigation he has not misused the
same in any manner and has regularly
joined the investigation till the filing of the
charge-sheet; he would not threat the
witnesses in any manner during trial and he
being government employee posted as
Section Officer in Ramjas College,
University of Delhi is having no chance of
absconding or fleeing from justice and as
such in the given facts and circumstances
he prayed for grant of regular bail.”
14. It has also been recorded by learned Additional
Sessions Judge that Investigating Officer of the case
Inspector Prabhu Dayal of police station Janakpuri, New
Delhi has filed reply giving details of allegations as
mentioned in the charge-sheet. In the last para he had
stated that on 19.01.2010, a PCR call regarding a threat was Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 7 of 20
received at police station vide DD No.18A and said DD was
marked to HC Khazan Singh, who conducted the inquiry and
had filed the said DD as untraced by recording DD No.51B
dated 09.01.2010. It is further recorded that the brother of
the deceased had also made a written complaint on
09.01.2010 to the SHO, Janakpuri, New Delhi, wherein, he
had been allegedly threatened by Surat Singh brother
of respondent No.2 either to withdraw the criminal case
instituted against his brother and mother otherwise his
family will be ruined.
15. The Trial Court has also recorded that Shri Vivek
Kumar, brother of deceased who is practicing advocate
assisted Ld Addl. PP for the State.
16. After hearing both the parties, it is observed by learned
Additional Sessions Judge, that in the order dated
07.03.2011 there was an inadvertent observation by this
court wherein it is stated that contents of the alleged
suicide note dated 28.06.2009 had been verified and
confirmed by the FSL report. On perusal of the FSL report
dated 09.11.2010, it revealed that the handwriting Q1 toCrl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 8 of 20
Q5 which is in Hindi & contents of the alleged suicide note
could not be tallied with A1 & A2 admitted
handwriting of the deceased collected during
investigation by the IO.
17. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has also recorded
submission of learned counsel for accused that on that day
despite conclusion of the investigation, there was no
admissible evidence in the form of a suicide note against
respondent No.2 and because of the verification of the
signature, and of alleged questioned writing in Q1 to Q5
could not be attributed to be the handwriting of the
deceased.
18. Learned Additional Sessions Judge has also recorded
that respondent No.2/accused had been joining the
investigations till the filing of the charge-sheet and witness
Shri Vivek Kumar and other family members have been
examined and their supplementary statements were
recorded during the investigation and they have not alleged
anything about the threats as allegedly stated in the
complaint dated 09.01.2010. Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 9 of 20
19. It is also recorded by learned Additional Sessions Judge
that statement of Shri Vivek Kumar on 26.04.2010 had
revealed nothing about the threat.
20. Regarding the contents of the FSL report and nonverification of the contents of the alleged suicide note,
learned APP had submitted that the brother of the deceased
Shri Vivek Kumar had stated that there were sufficient hand
writing of the deceased in Hindi, but the police had never
asked them to supply the same. In case police wanted the
handwriting of the deceased in Hindi, that could be given for
investigation and comparison of the contents of the suicide
note, allegedly written in Hindi and signed in English by the
deceased.
21. Admittedly, the suicide note left by the deceased is in
Hindi, whereas, the signature thereon of the deceased are in
English.
22. Learned Additional Sessions Judge on the basis of the
above discussion, had reached the conclusion that
respondent No.2/accused stated to be a government
employee working as Section Officer in Ramjas College, Delhi Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 10 of 20
University. His mother Smt.Maya Devi, co-accused had
already been admitted on bail. At the time of death,
deceased was living with her parents since 28.11.2009 i.e.
about a month before the death.
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the
attention of this Court to the suicide note, which is in Hindi,
however, the signature and few words in between are
written in English. He further submitted that the Trial Court
has gone wrong on the version that there is no report of the
FSL on the suicide note, which was in Hindi, therefore,
learned Additional Sessions Judge has formed his opinion on
a wrong premise.
24. Further submits that there was no change of
circumstances in the present case and same learned
Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the bail application of
the respondent No.2 before sending him to jail.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the
decision Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs.Rajesh Ranjan
@Pappu Yadav & Ors 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 wherein it
held as under:-Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 11 of 20
“Before concluding, we must note though
an accused has a right to make successive
applications for grant of bail the court
entertaining such subsequent bail
applications has a duty to consider the
reasons and grounds on which the earlier
bail applications were rejected. In such
cases, the court also has a duty to record
what are the fresh grounds which persuade
it to take a view different from the one
taken in the earlier applications. In the
impugned order we do not see any such
fresh ground recorded by the High Court
while granting bail. It also failed to take into
consideration that at least on four
occasions order refusing bail has been
affirmed by this Court and subsequently
when the High Court did grant bail, this
Court by its order dated 26th July, 2000
cancelled the said bail by a reasoned order.
From the impugned order, we do not notice
any indication of the fact that the High
Court took note of the grounds which
persuaded this Court to cancel the bail.
Such approach of the High Court, in our
opinion, is violative of the principle of
binding nature of judgments of superior
court rendered in a lis between the same Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 12 of 20
parties, and in effect tends to ignore and
thereby render ineffective the principles
enunciated therein which have a binding
character.”
26. Additionally relied upon Prakash Kadam Vs.
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta: (2011) 6 SCC 189
wherein it has been observed as under:-
“16. The Sessions Court granted bail to the
appellants but that has been cancelled by
the High Court by the impugned judgment.
17. xxx xxx xxx
18. In considering whether to cancel the
bail the court has also to consider the
gravity and nature of the offence, prima
facie case against the accused, the position
and standing of the accused, etc. If there
are very serious allegations against the
accused his bail may be cancelled even if
he has not misused the bail granted to him.
Morevoer, the above principle applies when
the same court which granted bail is
approached for cancelling the bail. It will
not apply when the order granted bail is
appealed against before an appellant/
Revisional Court. Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 13 of 20
19. In our opinion, there is no absolute
rule that once bail is granted to the
accused then it can only be cancelled if
there is likelihood of misuse of the bail. The
factor, though no doubt important, is not
the only factor. There are several other
factors also which may be seen while
deciding to cancel the bail.”
27. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has argued that
since 28.11.2009, deceased was with her parents because
on 01.12.2009, there was the marriage ceremony of the
brother of deceased. Admittedly, respondent No.2 attended
the ring ceremony on 30.11.2009. Somehow, due to some
altercation which took place with the brother of the
deceased; he did not attend the marriage on 01.12.2009.
28. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has drawn
attention of this Court to DD No.17A dated 13.09.2009,
wherein, no allegations of demand of dowry have been
recorded. He has further referred the statement of SI D. K.
Singh recorded under Section 161 Code of Criminal
Procedure, wherein, there are no allegations of demand of
dowry. Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 14 of 20
29. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 has relied upon
Bhagirathsingh Vs. State of Gujarat (1984) 1 SCC 284
wherein it has held as under:-
“In our opinion, the learned Judge appears
to have misdirected himself while
examining the question of directing
cancellation of bail by interfering with a
discretionary order made by the learned
Sessions Judge. One could have
appreciated the anxiety of the learned
Judge of the High Court that in the
circumstances found by him that the victim
attacked was a social and political worker
and therefore the accused should not be,
granted bail but we fail to appreciate how
that circumstance should be considered so
overriding as to permit interference with a
discretionary order of the learned Sessions
Judge granting bail. The High Court
completely overlooked the fact that it was
not for it to decide whether the bail should
be granted but the application before it was
for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and
overwhelming circumstances all necessary
for an order seeking cancellation of the
bail. And the trend today is towards
granting bail because it is now well-settled Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 15 of 20
by a catena of decisions of this Court that
the power to grant bail is not to be
exercised as if the punishment before trial
is being imposed. The only material
considerations in such a situation are
whether the accused would be readily
available for his trial and whether he is
likely to abuse the discretion granted ill his
favour by tampering with evidence. The
order made by the High Court is
conspicuous by its silence on these two
relevant considerations. It is for these
reasons that we consider in the interest of
justice a compelling necessity to interfere
with the order made by the High Court.”
30. Further relied upon Dolat Ram & Ors Vs. State of
Haryana:(1995) 1 SCC 349 wherein it has been observed
as under:-
“Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at
the initial stage and the cancellation of bail
so granted, have to be considered and
delay with on different basis. Very cogent
and overwhelming circumstances are
necessary for an order directing the
cancellation of the bail, already granted.
Generally speaking the grounds of Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 16 of 20
cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and
not exhaustive) are: interference or
attempt to interfere with the due course of
administration of justice or evasion or
attempt to evade the due course of justice
or abuse of the concession granted to the
accused in any manner. The satisfaction of
the Court, on the basis of material placed
on the record of the possibility of the
accused absconding is yet another reason
justifying the cancellation of bail. However,
bail once granted should not be cancelled
in a mechanical manner without
considering whether any supervening
circumstances have rendered it no longer
conducive to a fair trial to allow the
accused to retain his freedom by enjoying
the concession of bail during the trial.
These principles, it appears, were lost sight
of by the High Court when it decided to
cancel the bail, already granted. The High
Court it appears to us overlooked the
distinction of the factors relevant for
rejecting bail in a non-bailable case in the
first instance and the cancellation of bail
already granted”.Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 17 of 20
31. Additionally relied upon Samarendra Nath
Bhattacharjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Another:
(2004) 11 SCC 165 wherein it has been observed that:-
“11.Having heard the learned counsel and
having perused the records of the we
notice that the trial court after looking into
the case diary and other material produced
before it and also noticing the fact that
investigating agency had only sought
judicial remand, and the argument of the
possibility of accused tampering with the
evidence still taking into consideration the
age and ailments of the accused appellant
granted bail on stringent condition.
12. Per contra, the High Court, in our
opinion, has approached the case as if it is
an appeal against the conviction by giving
findings on factual issues which are yet to
be decided which, in our opinion, is too
premature and is likely to prejudice the
trial. For example, this is what the High
Court had to observe at one part of its
judgment that:
"She was battered, abused; above
all, she was wronged in her castle
with which she had unknowingly
built with quick sand and
ultimately, happiness which she Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 18 of 20
so passionately sought for turned
down to be a teasing mirage for
her."
13. This finding, in our opinion, could be
construed as a finding accepting the
allegation of the complainant which might
prejudice the case of the defence, at any
rate these findings are unnecessary while
considering a petition for cancellation of
bail. That apart since the only ground on
which the cancellation could have been
ordered being the ground of intimidation
which, in our opinion, is not satisfactorily
proved, the High Court erred in cancelling
the bail granted to the appellant.”
32. Indisputably, relief in the second bail application had
been granted to the respondent No.2 after he has spent 45
days in custody. Earlier, the order dated 07.03.2011 was
passed on the premise that FSL report has confirmed the
handwriting of the deceased wherein direct allegations of
physical cruelty and mental cruelty are alleged on
respondent No.2.
33. Vide the impugned order, learned Trial Court has
granted bail on the ground that FSL report dated 09.11.2010; Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 19 of 20
the handwriting Q1 to Q5 which is in Hindi and the contents
of the alleged suicide note could not be tallied with A1 and
A2. The observation in the FSL report that writing Q1 to Q5
could not be attributed to be handwriting of the deceased.
34. Giving any opinion on the facts of the case at this stage
would prejudice the trial as the matter is still in its infancy.
However, it is well settled that once bail is granted the same
should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner, without
considering whether any supervening circumstances have
rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial, to allow the
accused, to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of
bail during trial.
35. In my opinion, at the time of deciding the second bail
application, the changed circumstances before the learned
Trial Court was that, respondent No.2 remained in jail for 45
days.
36. Further, there is no apprehension of absconding by
respondent No.2/accused, as he is employed as Section
Officer in Ramjas College, University of Delhi. The suicide
note was in Hindi; whereas the opinion of the handwriting Crl.M.C.No.1719/2011 Page 20 of 20
expert is only given in regard to the signatures, which are in
English. The co-accused has already been granted bail. It is
noted that respondent No.2 had fully co-operated in the
investigation, with the investigating agency during the
interim relief granted to him.
37. For the reasons stated above I am of the considered
view that no ground to interfere with the impugned order
passed by learned Trial Court is made out. The said order is
a well reasoned order and I conquer with the same.
38. Hence, Criminal M.C.No.1719/201 is dismissed.
39. No costs.
SURESH KAIT, J
September 22th
, 2011
Mk

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